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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LOIS H. WHITE, Widow of PAUL
WHITE, deceased,

Applicant and Appellant,
-vs.Case No. 8193
N. P. METTOME C 0 M PAN Y,
STATE INSUR.ANCE FUND and
INDUSTRIAL C·0~1:MISSION OF
UTAH,

Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action against the State Insurance Fund
before the Industrial Commission of Utah by the Appellant, Lois H. White, widow of Paul White, deceased,
to recover compensation as a result of the death of Paul
White in the course of his employment.
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T'he Industrial Con1mission heard the evidence on the
4th day of February, 1954, beginning at 10:00 A.M. The
hearing was held before Robert J. Shaughnessy, Referee.
The Con1mission entered its order on the 4th day of
l\farch, 1954, denying the clai1n of the Appellant. The
Appellant thereafter on the 13th day of March, 1954, filed
an application ·before the Industrial Con1n1ission for a
re-hearing, which ap'Plication for re-hearing \vas denied
on April 8th, 1954.
The Ap·pellant filed her Petition for 'Vrit of Certiorari on the 1st day of l\{ay, 1954, and the In'dustrial Con1mission of Utah filed w:bth this Court the record of this
ca:se on the 17th day of May, 1954.
STATEMENT OF· F:ACTS
The facts of this case are very sin1ple. Lois H.
White, the Ap·pellant, and Paul White, the deceased,
were married on the 21st day of Nove1nber, 1941, and
a Decree of Divorce \Vas awarded to Lois I-I. vVhite fron1
Paul White, Case No. 99089, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, ·State of Utah, on the lOth day of July,
1953.
On the 6th day of October, 1953, while Paul vVhite
"\vas employed as an iron\vorker by the N. P. :Niettome
Company, he sustained an injury arising out of, or in the
course of, his employment and died as a result of said injury two days later on October 8th, 1953. He \Vas earning
$2.67 per hour on a 40 hour p·er week basis.
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During the period of tiine between the date of the
divorce and the date of the death, Mr. and Mrs. White
had seen each other on a number of occasions and had
con1municated by telephone on numerous other occasions.
At the tune of and prior to the divorce Mr. White had
been addicted to the excessive use of alcoholic beverages,
and ~1rs. "\Vhite had insisted on a divorce with the hope
that he \vould straighten up and terminate his excessive
drinking; in \Vhich event, the parties had agreed that
they \vould resu1ne their marital relationship and have
the decree set aside during that period of time.
Between the date of the divorce and the date of the
death of 1\Ir. \Vhite, l\Ir. White had ceased his excessive
drinking and had been employed steadily, and Mr. and
l\1rs. White had discussed on several occasions the setting
aside of the divorce and the resumption of the marriage.
Just a day or t''ro before the death of
talked \vith
Inent

\\~ith

jlr~.

~1r.

\Vhite he had

\\l1ite and had 1nade a specific appoint-

her for the following Sunday, at \vhich time

they planned to complete their arrange1nents to set aside
the divoree and to go back and live together as 1nan and
\vife, and she agreed with hirn that she would quit work
and go back and take care of the house, and that he -vvould
continue \\'orking and n1aintain and support then1 after
resu1nption of their Inarital status. Before this eventful
Sunday arrived of course l\Ir. White was killed and the
resu1nption of the marriage, of course, never took place
as they had planned.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
POINT I
T·HE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT LOIS
H. WHITE AND PAUL WHITE WERE NOT HUSBAND AND
WIFE.

P·OINT II
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO DEPENDENCY NOR PRESUMPTION OF DEPENDENCY BY MRS. WHITE ON HER HUSBAND, PAUL WHITE.

POINT III
THE CO:MMISSION 'ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
·wAS NO AGR.EED DEPENDENCY OF MRS. WHITE ON
HER HUSBAND, MR. WHITE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION ER.RED IN FINDING THAT LOIS
H. WHITE AND PAUL WHITE WERE NOT HUSBAND AND
WIFE.

The cases seem to hold almost unani1nously that the
death of a spouse during the interlocutory period of divorce tern1inates the marriage rather than the running
of the interlocutory period as the following cases unequivocably intlicated :

Remley v. Remley, 193 P. 604
This was an action for divorce "~herein the
court ordered th·e payment of a monthly allowance
for the support of minor children, and gave a lien
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to the plaintiff to secure the payment of the allo\va.nce against defendant's interest in homestead
property:
(2) 'l'he interlocutory judgment in a divorce
aetion is not a decree of divorce nor does it dissolve the 1narriage. It j s rnerely a declaration that
one of the spouse~ is entitled to a divorce (section
131, CiY. Code), and ,,..hen one year has expired
after the en tr~· of such in terloeutory judgrnent the
court n1ay enter the final judgrnent, granting the
divorce, and such other relief as 1nay be necessary
to co1nplete disposition of the action.
( 3) In its decision the court should deterInine \\·hether a divorce ought to he granted; it
should designate the party entitled thereto, and
if propert~r rights are involved it should deterllline ho'v the property shoulid be disposed of or
a~signed 'vhen such divorce is granted.

Goulcl v. Superior Court, 191 P. 56.
This action \\·a::; originally a divorce action
brought hy Frank H. Gould against his \Vife,
Nettie Gould, and on her cross-con1plaint she was
granted a decree and eertain properties and
rnonthly payn1ents as per1nanent ali1nony. Frank
H. Goultcl died one 1nonth after the interlocutory
decree was entered:
( 1) Under the provisions of section 132 of
the Civil Code, the 1narital status of the parties
\Yas not affected by the interlocutory decree, further than that it established conclusively, unless
~et aside on appeal or in ~orne other Inanner expressly provided by statute, the defendant's right
to divorce upon the expiration of the statutory
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period of one year, which 1nust elapse between
the entry of the interlocutory decree and the final
judgn1ent disssolving tl1e rnarriage.
(6 ['\J 7) The death of the husband ter1ninated
the n1arital relationship. - - -· Upon the death
of the husband, the rights of the wife under the
laws of succession, if he died intestate, were fixed,
unless those rights had theretofore been changed
by contract vtith the husband.
(8 & 9)

Since the marriage was not dissolved by the entry of the final decree, but hy the
death of tl1e husband - - - it would appear- - that the entry of the final decree accomplished nothing.
,Gloyd v. S1tperior Court, 185 P. 995.

This '\Vas a ease where Albert M. Gloyd was
granted an interlocutory decree against his wife.
Shortly thereafter and during the interlocutory
period he 'died and she clain1s his estate as his
vvido,v. The court held that the death terminated
the n1arriage and not the divorce, and stated as
follO'\VS:
That relation and status having been dissolved by death, the petitioner, ~faiette S. Gloyd,
forthvvith became the surviving wife of Albert M.
Gloyd, vvith the vested right to be recognized as
his '\Vidovv and '\vith such furth.er vested rights of
property as n1ay result from the fact that she '\vas
his .,vife at the tirne of his death.
(3)

1

The Court in this ·same ca:se quoted from the
estate of 'Valker, 168 P. 689, in which case the
court stated:
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HThe 1narriage relation existing betw"een the .
husband and wife was not dissolved by the interlocutor~v decree of divorce, but by the death of
the husband on N ove1nber 20, 1913."
The following cases all hold specifically that
an interlocutory decree of divorce does not ternlinate the rnarriage and that the ruarriage is not
terininated until the expiration of the interlocutory period, and that a 111arriage contracted during the interlocutory period is void ah initio because of the prior exi~ting rnarriage and that a
death \vhich occurs during the interlocutory period ter1ninates the 1narriage and not the death.:
Sanders v. Industrial Connnission (230 P.
1026) ~ Salt Lake City v. Industrial Co1nmission
(:2:2 I). 2d 1046) ~ l{Jebora v. l{Jebora (5 P 2d 965)
Re: Johnson's Estate-Johnson v. Johnson (35
P. 2d 305).

POINT II
TI-IE CO?dl\fiSSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO DEPENDENCY NOR PRESUTv1PTION OF DEPENDENCY BY l\1RS. WHITE ON HER HUSBAND, PAUL WHITE.
~Phe

courts hold \vith reference to Point II that the

lack of actual support by the husband does not of itself
negatiYe dependency, whieh

theor~T

follo"\ving as "\vell as in 1nany other

is borne out in the

ca~cs

:

Diaz vs. Industrial Conunission of Utah) 13 P. 2d :307.
In this ca:se the \vife and children had heen
separated fro1n the husband for approximately
tv~.,.o years, hut the separation di\d not elin1inate the
hushnnd's ohligation to support, nor did it termiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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nate the dependency of the "rife on the husband.
There are numerous cases cited in this case upholding the same ·doctrine.
lJfcGarry vs. Iruiust1*ial Corn1nissi-on., 222 I>. 592.

Thi's court
authority which
port during the
essential to the
ency",

stated that ~·,ve kno\v of no
holds that the furnishing of suplife of the deceased is absolutely
establishment of actual depend-

Merrill vs. Penasco L1onber

Con~pany,

204 P. 72.

The court sai'd "That just as the existance of
the marital status does not of itself proYe dependency, so the lack of actual support by the
husband does not of itself negative dependency".

POINT III
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO AGREED DEPENDENCY O·F MRS. WHITE ON
HER HUSBAND, MR. WHITE.

With reference to Point III, this court has laid do,vn
.the law on this point very clearly as set forth in the case
of, Utah Galena Corporation et al vs. Industrial Connnis-

sion et al, 5P. 2·d 242 :

This is a case involving the question of dependency.
Judge Folland in his opinion in this case
quotes as follows from 28 R.C.L. pages 770 and
771, as being the la\v in the State of l!tah:
(a) "As a very general proposition it n1ay
be said that a dependent is one 'vho looked to or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

relied on the decendent for support and maintenance. Reliance n1ust have been placed upon
the deceased employee to provide the applicant
for con1pensation, in so1ne Ineasure or to so1ne
extent, \Yith his or her ft~:turc living expenses.
o;;< '~ * rrhe purpose of the statute is to provide the
\Vorlnnan's dependent in fnt u re \Vi th something in
substitution for \vhat has been lost by the workUlan's death, and consequently, to establish dependene:- the applicant for cou1pensation Inust
sho\v that he or she had reasonable grou(n:ds to
an.ficipatc future support froin the decedent. This
reasonable (\Tpectation of continning or fu.tnre
support and nza.intcnauce seen1s to be the true
criterion as to zcho are dependents."
Judge Folland in the san1e opinion quotes
fron1 :!S R. C.L. at page 771, the follo\ving as being
the la,,- of the State of l:tah:
.:._,__\_ person may be a dependent, according to
this \-ie,v, although able to 1naintain hi1nself \vithout any assistance from the decedent. And so the
n1ere ability to earn a livelihood \vill not prevent
one fro1n being a dependent."
In the instant case Jirs. \\Thite had been supporting
herself of necessity after the Decree of Divorce, but she
certainly had anticipated being able to quit her job and
stay hon1e \\-hile her husband \vorked and earned a livelihood for both of the1n, in faet, it was 1nore than a 1nere
an tici pa tion, it

\Ya~s

a specific agreement. The parties

had specifically agreed that "\Vhen n1r. \i\Thite quit drinking (and the fact is uncontroverted that he had quit
drinking) they \vould resu1ne their marital relation and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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she would quit work and he would support her. This
specific agreement was not necessary as he had ·the obligation by law to do so even without the agree1nent.

CONCLUSION
In co.nclusion it is important to note that all of the
facts herein stated and all of the evidence of !Irs. White
is uncontroverted; therefore, we can but conclude (1)
that the marriage of ~Ir. and Mrs. White 'vas ternilnated
by the death of J\1r. White, and was not therefore effected
by the running of the interlocutory period, and (2) that
although Mrs. \:Y-.-hite "\Vas not only employed during
the p:eriod of tin1e frotn the date of divorce to. the date
of the death of Mr. ,.V11ite but she was employed prior
to the divorce also, nevertheless she was a dependant
by law both before the divorce and after the divorce; and,
that although she did not receive her actual support fron1
h.i1n at the tin1e of his death she did have a reasonable
future anticipation of dep·endency., and under the la'Y
previously stated by this court, that is sufficient to
establish dependency to justify an award, and the Appellant therefore respectfully submits that this caJse should
be reversed an·d an award made to the Appellant in the
amount provided for by statute for the death of her
husband '\Vhile in the ·course of his en1ployn1ent.
Respectfully subn1itted,

C. VERNON LANGLOIS
Attorney for Appellant
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